零售商采购资金约束下供应链融资方式的选择策略研究

Study on the Selection Strategy of Supply Chain Financing Methods with Retailer's Procurement Capital Constraint

在单一供应商—单一零售商构成的二级供应链中,供应商为Stackelberg博弈领导者,零售商为跟随者。在产品市场需求服从均匀分布这一假设前提下,建立了当零售商受采购资金约束时,供应链采取商业信用和存货质押两种融资方式的决策模型,并从零售商和供应商的共同利益出发,给出了这两种融资方式的选择策略。算例分析研究的结果表明,当零售商自有资金较少时,若银行给定合适的贷款利率,供应链应采取存货质押这一融资方式;当零售商自有资金大于一定程度时,供应链应采取商业信用这一融资方式。

Capital constraint is a common problem facing enterprises. How to masonably provide effective financing service to enterprises is an important topic in the supply chain financing research. When one retailer has not enough capital for optimal order quantity, it has two fmancing options： （1） its supplier offers a delayed payment deadline so that the retailer will gain internal financing from supplier＇s trade credit, and （2） the bank provides inventory financing service under the supplier＇s buy-back guarantee so that the retailer will gain external financing from the bank. However, the supplier should promise to take some responsibilities and risks for each financing option. As for the supply chain, which financing way should be chosen to make retailer and supplier achieve a win-win objective is the main research question of this paper. In this paper, a supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer. Supplier is the leader and retailer is the follower in the Staekelberg game. Based on the assumption that the product market demand is random and satisfies uniform distribution, we constructed decision models for a supply chain with trade credit and inventory financing methods respectively, and presented the optimal trade credit term and optimal buy-back price for supplier. Furthermore, considering the mutual interests of retailer and supplier, we developed the selection strategies of supply chain financing methods. After analyzing numerical examples, some research conclusions are derived as following： （1） Either with trade credit or with inventory financing method, retailer＇s order quantity has been insignificantly increased, and both retailer and supplier will gain more profit. It is shown that fmancing will create value for supply chain, and effectively solve the problem of retailer＇s procurement capital constraint. （2） When a retailer owns less original capital, if a bank gives appropriate loan rate, the inventory financing will be preferred to trade credit financing method. Supplier should promise buy-back guarantee for retailer, and the optimal buy-back price per unit of product deereases with the increasing of retailer＇s self-owned capital. The inventory financing will bring more profit for the supplier relative to the retailer. （3） When a retailer＇s original procurement capital is large, supplier will prefer to offer trade credit financing to retailer, and the optimal credit term will be longer with the increase of retailer＇s self-owned capital. Even if a retailer has enough fund for its optimal order quantity without capital constraint （i.e., the order quantity derived from the elassic newsvendor model）, the trade credit will still increase retailer＇s order quantity and then improve the gains for both retailer and supplier. However, the prerequisite is that supplier has sufficient capital to withstand some possible risks, such as the gap of production fund, cash flow difficulties, et al. Therefore, trade credit is suitable for the case that a retailer has some of its own capital and a supplier has abundant capital.