收益共享寄售契约下考虑碳减排的供应链绩效

Supply Chain Performance under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing Considering Carbon Emission Reduction

环境意识对供应链的结构设计变得越发重要,随着消费者低碳意识的提高及政府对制造商碳排放的规制,制造商开始进行减排研发生产低碳化产品。在收益共享的寄售契约下,研究由一个上游制造商和一个下游零售商构成的单周期两级供应链,利用博弈理论建立模型,制造商决策产品产量及减排率,零售商决策收益共享比例。研究表明供应链绩效和单个企业绩效依赖于需求的减排敏感性系数和零售商的成本分担比例,渠道的利润损失随减排敏感性系数增大而增大,随零售商成本分担比例增大而减小。最后,通过算例分析了供应链系统参数对最优决策及供应链绩效的影响,实证了减排敏感型需求下供应链的绩效损失及利润分成水平。

The low-carbon economy is proliferating rapidly. In the context, the operational mode of supply chain is moving from the traditional way to the low-carbonization mode. Many manufactories have taken a series of measures to reduce CO2 emission. Land Rover car manufacturer has developed carbon labels for every cars produced by its factories in order to create a low-carbon world. Land Rover is the first vehicle company in China that compensate all CO2 emissions produced by its cars. In our country, we signed the ＂Kynto Protocol＂ and made a commitment that the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP in 2020 will be reducod by 40% to 45%, of 2005. Therefore, considering carbon trading market practices in Europe, the government intends to use the cap-and-trade to limit enterprises＇ CO2 emissions. The consignment contract with revenue sharing has been widely used in various areas, such as leasing, retailing, raw material procurement, in the electricity supplier market. The supply chain is a complex network composed of different decision-making agents. Typically, supply chains could usecentralized and decentralized decision methods to help parties involved coordinate with each other. Nevertheless, the decentralized decision-making is more common than the centralized decision-making in practice. Thus, the contact coordination problem of supply chain operations is an important research question. A contract can help coordinate the supply chain if supply chain optimal actions reach Nash equilibrium. No firms have a profitable unilateral deviation from the set of supply chain optimal actions. Ideally the optimal actions should also be a unique Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, the firms may need to coordinate on a sub-optimal set of actions. Environmental awareness becomes increasingly important for the structure design of supply chains. With the increasing customer awareness of low-carbon economy, manufacturers begin to research and develop emission reduction methods in order to make low-carbonization products. Under a consignment contract with revenue sharing, this paper investigates a single-period product and a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer. The model is constructed by using the game theory. The manufacturer decides the delivery quantity and the rate of carbon emission reduction. For each item sold, the retailer determines the revenue sharing. The research shows that supply chain performance and individual firm＇s performance depend on emission reduction of sensitive coefficient and the retailer＇s share of channel cost. The channel performance loss increases with emission reduction of sensitive coefficients and decreases with the retailer＇s cost share. In the end, a numerical analysis is presented to test the effects of supply chain performance for different system parameters and illustrates performance Joss and profit division under the emission reduction of sensitive demand.