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基于亚当·斯密“合宜性”理论的人类个体行为模型 被引量:6

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摘要 在《道德情操论》中,亚当·斯密清楚地给出了一个关于个体行为理论的模型,这个理论模型解释了像人这样自利自爱的生物如何在遵守合宜性和满足自我激情之间权衡,从而成功地控制自己的情感与行为,使一个公序良俗的社会得以持存。斯密笔下的人,是在合宜性约束下进行自我关照的个体,这一人性假定在《道德情操论》和《国富论》中是一脉相承的。同一个体在不同情境下的行为差异、同一情境中不同个体之间的行为差距、不同社会之间文明程度的差别,取决于对何种行为合宜之理解不同以及对合宜性的在意程度有差异。以斯密合宜性理论为基础而构建的行为理论以及社会经济秩序理论可以很好地统合既有研究中的大量证据和思路,为我们把握人类决策的情感面以及基于此而生成的社会经济秩序提供强有力的范式。该模型为改进现代主流经济学理性人模型的内在缺陷提供了有益尝试。
作者 罗卫东 刘璐
出处 《社会科学战线》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第7期35-45,共11页 Social Science Front
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参考文献55

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二级参考文献52

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