地方政府股权会影响城市商业银行信贷投放的周期性特征吗?

Do Ownerships of Local Governments Affect the Cyclical Characteristics of City Commercial Banks' Lending?

与全国性金融机构相比,我国城市商业银行与地方经济发展之间存在着更密切的内在联系。一方面,地方政府通过股权控制、高管派遣等机制促使城市商业银行服务于地方经济;另一方面,城市商业银行的发展也离不开地方经济发展。本文利用我国69家城市商业银行2005-2013年的年度非平衡面板数据,从地方经济周期波动的角度,实证分析了我国城市商业银行信贷投放的周期性特征和区域差异,以及不同区域政府持股变化对城市商业银行信贷周期特征的影响。结论表明,城市商业银行信贷投放行为表现出显著的逆周期特征,且在中西部地区更为明显。总体上,政府持股比例增加会强化城市商业银行信贷投放的逆周期性。但从分地区来看,东部地区地方政府持股比例的增加会显著增强其逆周期特征,而在中西部地区,政府持股比例的变化与城市商业银行信贷投放逆周期之间关系不显著。

Compared to national financial institutions,there are intrinsic links between city commercial bank and the development of local economy. On the on hand,local government urges city commercial bank to serve local economy by using equity control and executive appointment.On the other hand,the development of city commercial banks relies on the development of local economy. Using an unbalanced panel data of 69 China ＇s city commercial banks from 2005 to2013,this paper empirically investigates the cyclical characteristics of city commercial banks ＇lending behaviors as well as regional differences,and how the equity changes of local governments in different regions affect those cyclical characteristics.The results show that the lending behaviors of China ＇s city commercial banks are significantly counter- cyclical,and this relationship is stronger in the middle and western regions. In general,an increase in local government ＇s ownerships will strengthen the counter-cyclicality effect.However,in the regional perspective,only rises in the eastern local governments ＇ ownerships will significantly strengthen the counter-cyclicality effect while the relationships between equity changes of local governments and city commercial banks＇ counter-cyclical lending behaviors are insignificant in the middle and western regions.