信息披露考评与CEO变更

Information Disclosure Evaluation and CEO Turnover

更多的信息披露对委托人和监管者是有利的,但是一个更知情的委托人和监管者对代理人是不利的。深交所信息披露考评的存在,使得信息披露较低的公司面临提高信息披露水平的压力。而更多的信息披露不但增加了判断CEO表现的信息,而且也减少了CEO的私人收益,这可能导致更多的CEO变更。使用深交所的信息考评数据,我们发现,上市公司提高信息披露水平的压力越大,CEO变更的概率越大。因此,提高信息披露质量的外在监管压力可以成为改善上市公司治理的重要途径。

More information disclosure is beneficial to principal and monitor, but unfavorable to agent. The existence of information e-valuation in Shenzhen Stock Exchange has got the firms with lower information disclosure face the pressure to increase it. However,more information disclosure not only offers more information on judging the performance of CEOs, but also reduces the private benefits of CEOs, which may result in more CEO turnover. Using the information evaluation data from Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we find that the higher the pressure, the higher the probability of CEO leaving. Hence, the external regulatory pressure of increasing information quality and transparency could be an important way to improve corporate governance of listed firms.