ATM跨行交易独立定价与联合定价比较研究

A comparative study on the independent and collective pricing in ATM networks

通过构建博弈模型研究单向接入与双向接入下ATM跨行交易定价机理,比较独立定价与联合定价下跨行交易手续费的差异.研究发现:1)在独立决策下,银行或独立ATM运营机构(IAD)均采用基于平均取款成本的加价模式制订交换费,其中加价以持卡人的单位交通成本为基础;2)不管是独立决策抑或联合决策,规模越大的银行倾向于制订越高的跨行交易手续费,跨行交易手续费以持卡人的单位交通成本为加项,但以开户行与代理行的成本差为减项;3)在单向接入下,联合制订的交换费是社会有效的边际成本定价;4)在双向接入下,联合制订的交换费遵循Ramsey定价原理,即等于所有银行提供全部跨行交易服务的平均成本,当持卡人的单位交通成本较高时,联合决策可以降低双向交换费.

This paper establishes a pricing game to study ATM service fees in both one-way access and two- way access, and compares the differences of service fees between independent and collective pricing scheme. The model yields some new insights on ATM pricing which contribute to explaining the pricing practices in China. It shows that, in an independent pricing scheme, banks or independent ATM deployers （IAD） would set the interchange fee in a plus pricing pattern based on average withdrawal costs. Among them, the unit transport cost of cardholder makes up the basis for the plus term. Regardless of the independent or collective pricing scheme, large banks are prone to set higher foreign fees using the unit transport cost of cardholder as an additive term, but the cost difference between home and agent bank as a subtracted term. The collective- setting interchange fee abides by marginal cost pricing rule and is socially efficient in the one-way access. As a comparison, the collective-setting interchange fee abides by Ramsey pricing principle in the two-way access, i.e. it amounts to the average cost of all banks. Notably, the collective pricing scheme lowers the two-way in- terchange fee as long as the unit transport cost of cardholders is high enough.