科技成果评价中学术造假问题的混合策略博弈分析

Mixed-strategy Game Analysis of Academic Fraud in Sci-tech Achievement Evaluation

科技成果评价中的学术造假问题,从博弈论的角度看,其实就是科技工作者和评审专家之间的一场博弈。通过建立科技成果评价中学术造假问题的混合策略博弈模型,计算出博弈的混合纳什均衡解,并从评审专家的信息甄别成本、评审专家发现学术造假的奖励因子、科技工作者被发现造假后受到惩罚的概率及惩罚程度等方面对模型均衡解进行深入分析,结果发现提高惩罚的严厉性与确定性、提高评审专家的奖励因子和降低评审专家的信息甄别成本能有效抑制科技成果评价中的学术造假问题。

From the perspective of game theory,academic fraud in the evaluation of scientific and technological achievements is in fact a game between sci-tech staff and evaluation experts.By establishing the mixed-strategy game model of academic fraud in sci-tech achievement evaluation,the mixed Nash equilibrium solution was calculated,and the equilibrium solution based on such aspects as evaluation experts＇ information screening cost,evaluation experts＇ reward for discovering academic fraud,and the penalty probability as well as punishment degree was analyzed thoroughly. The results indicated that improving the severity and certainty of punishment,increasing evaluation experts＇ reward,and reducing evaluation experts＇ information screening cost could effectively inhibit academic fraud in sci-tech academic evaluation.