创业企业控制权配置对创业投资机构退出方式影响研究——来自中国创业投资业的经验证据

Impact of Allocation of Control Rights of Venture Firm on Venture Capital's Exit Ways——Based on Empirical Analysis of Chinese Venture Capital

创业企业控制权配置是创业投资机构有效退出的重要保证,对投资机构退出方式具有重要影响。从IPO和并购这两种退出方式视角,选取CVSource数据库2000—2014年大样本数据,使用多变量回归模型,研究创业企业控制权不同配置对创业投资机构退出方式的影响。研究发现,创业企业家拥有的控制权比例与IPO退出方式显著正相关,企业家拥有的控制权越多,对其产生的期权激励作用越大,越会促使创业投资机构通过IPO方式退出;而创业投资机构拥有的控制权比例与并购退出方式存在显著正相关关系,创业投资机构拥有的控制权越多,为了尽早收回投资,保护自身利益,实现较高投资收益,其越会选择通过并购方式退出。

The allocation of the control rights of the venture firm is an important guarantee for the effective exit of venture capital ,has an important influence on the way of exit of venture capital ,from two aspects of IPO and acquisition ,using a large sample data from CVsource Database during the period from 2000 to 2014 ,adopting the multiple regression model , this paper investigates the impact of different allocation of control rights of venture firm on venture capital＇s exit w ays .We find that there is an significant positive relationship between entrepreneurs＇s control rights proportion and IPO exit ,the more control rights of entrepreneurs ,the greater the incentive effect of the option for the entrepreneur ,entrepreneurs would promote venture investment to exit through the IPO ;there is an significant positive relationship between venture capital＇s control rights proportion and acquisition exit ,the more control rights of venture capital ,in order to recover the in‐vestment as soon as possible ,protect their own interests ,achieve higher investment returns ,venture capital will exit through acquisition .