股份全流通推进、控股股东与企业现金分红决策

Full Circulation of Stock,Controlling Shareholder and Corporate Cash Dividend Policy

基于沪深股市2006—2011年上市公司数据,实证检验我国资本市场股份全流通推进过程中控股股东代理问题的变迁及其对公司现金分红决策的影响。研究发现:控股股东持股强化了公司分红决策的资源配置功能;控股股东主导下的公司分红行为对公司可持续增长表现出积极影响,并有助于企业价值提升。全流通市场下控股股东并不存在实施过度分红的"掏空"动机,相反,控股股东主导下的公司分红行为有助于代理问题的改善。以上的经验证据表明,随着股份全流通的推进,控股股东在公司分红决策中的角色逐步从"利益侵占"向"利益共享"转变。

Based on the data from year 2006 to year 2011 of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market,we study the changes of agency problem of controlling shareholder in the process of stock full circulation and its influence on cash dividend policy.Empirical results shows that,the controlling shareholder strengthen the resource allocation function of cash dividend policy;Cash dividend policy under the guidance of controlling shareholder have positive effect on corporate sustainable growth; Cash dividend policy under the guidance of controlling shareholder can contribute to corporate value.Controlling shareholders have no motive of tunneling through cash dividend paying.Otherwise,cash dividend policy under the guidance of controlling shareholder can ease the agency problem of listed firms.Hence,with the full circulation of stock,the role of controlling shareholders in dividend decision-making have gradually made a transition from ＂interests expropriation＂ to ＂interests share＂.