制造业上市公司股权结构对非效率投资的影响

The Impact of Equit Structure of Public Listed Manufacturing Companies on Inefficient Investment

以2012-2014年沪深三年制造业上市公司为样本数据,研究股权结构对非效率投资的影响。实证结果表明:绝大多数的公司都或多或少的有着非效率投资的现象,多数公司存在投资不足的现象,但是当公司国有股持股比例增加时会造成公司的过度投资。第一大股东持股比例越高会造成公司过度投资现象。当终极控制人性质为国有时,公司的非效率投资更有过度投资倾向,为非国有时有投资不足倾向。因此应适当控制国有股在公司中的集中度,形成股东间的监督与制约,防止大股东掏空现象的发生,从而使公司投资决策更加科学化,减少公司非效率投资的发生。

Taking data of manufacturing companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2012 to 2014 as the sample, the study analyzes the impact of equity structure on inefficient investment. Empirical analysis shows that the vast majority of companies have more or less inefficient investment and most companies have insufficient investment. However, when the state-owned share ratio in-creases, excessive investment happens. More higher share ratio of the largest shareholder will result in over-investment. When the ultimate controller is state-owned, the inefficient investment is more serious;when the controller is non state-owned, there is a tendency of insuffi-cient investment. As a result, the state-owned share ratio should be kept at a proper concentration level so as to encourage supervision and restriction between shareholders and prevent from asset stripping by major shareholders. In so doing, the investment decisions may be made in more scientific manners for cutting down inefficient investment.