财政补贴、代理问题与企业技术创新——基于R&D投资异质性视角

Fiscal Subsidies,Agency Problem and Technological Innovation——Based on R&D Heterogeneity

利用深圳证券交易所2008~2013年上市高新技术企业的数据,基于第二类委托代理问题,研究政府财政补贴对创新投入与创新模式的影响。研究结果显示：财政补贴对高新技术企业的创新投入具有正向促进作用;财政补贴对创新模式的影响存在差异,即财政补贴对探索式创新有激励作用,而对开发式创新没有作用;控制权私有收益对财政补贴与创新投入之间有负向调节作用;控制权私有收益对财政补贴与探索式创新产生正向调节作用,而控制权私有收益对财政补贴与开发式创新之间的关系不起作用。

Taking listed Hi-tech Enterprises in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2013 as samples,this paper analyzes the impact of fiscal subsidy on enterprises’ technological innovation and innovation mode based on the 2ndtype agency problem. Results show that,firstly,the fiscal subsidy has stimulating effect on Hi-tech Enterprises’ technological innovation.Secondly,fiscal subsidy has different impact on innovation mode. The fiscal subsidy has promoting effect to the exploratory innovation,but does not work for the exploitative innovation. Thirdly,private benefits of control negatively moderate the relationship between fiscal subsidy and technological innovation. In the end,Private benefits of control positively moderate the relationship between fiscal subsidy and exploratory innovation. However,private benefits of control does not play a role in the relationship between fiscal subsidy and exploitative innovation.