人民银行征信监管现状及问题分析——基于博弈论等管理学视角

Analysis on the Current Situation and Problems of PBC Credit Reporting Supervision——Based on the Perspective of Game Theory and Other Management Theories

应对日益多发的征信违法案件,降低监管成本,提高征信业务执法检查的针对性和有效性,完善激励约束机制,实现风险防范关口前移,迫在眉睫。借鉴博弈论等管理学原理,从监管制度设计入手,主动构建"囚徒困境",建立"轻惩承认违规者,重处拒认违规者"的监管制度。同时,将征信监管链条延伸到被监管机构的管理内核中,并利用科技等手段,将管结果变为管过程,将现场监管变为非现场监管,重预防重惩处,形成自我监管、自律操作的良性互动局面。

It is urgent to cope with the increasing credit violation cases, to reduce regulatory costs, to improve the pertinence and effectiveness of credit business law enforcement inspection, to perfect the incentive and restraint mechanisms, and to make risk prevention at earlier stages. Learning from game theory and other management theories, starting from the design of supervisory system, the paper proposes that we should take the initiative to build the ＂prisoner＇ s dilemma＂ and establish a regulatory system featuring ＂light punishment to those who admit violating the rules, and heavy punishment to those who deny violating the rules＂. At the same time, we should make the credit supervision chain extend to regulators management core, change result-centered management into processcentered management by using technical means, change on-site supervision into off-site supervision, focus prevention and punishment, and foster a sound interaction of self-supervision and self-discipline operation.