认知实用主义问题

The Pragmatic Problems of Cognition

20世纪50年代,随着认知主义假说的提出,关于认知科学的讨论聚讼纷纭。由于认知主义假说面临着诸多问题,如今,认知科学正经历着一场改造运动。在这场改造运动中,认知实用主义是重要的竞选者。认知科学需要一个认知实用主义的转向。这个转向可以通过"行动核心性假说"来刻画,这一假说既是认知实用主义理论的必要条件,也是充分条件。需要考察对该假说可能的反驳:一种反驳质疑这一假说的充分性(代表是皮埃尔·施泰纳),另一种反驳诘问该假说的必要性(代表是杰瑞·福多)。关于认知实用主义的讨论刚刚起步,在行动理论、实践知识理论等方面还待进一步开拓。

Cognitivism has been viewed as the dominant theory at the beginning stage of the development of Cognitive Science in the 1950 s. But Cognitive Science soon embarked in a process of substantial transformations. Cognitive pragmatism plays an important role in this process of transformations. In this paper,I propose that the pragmatist turn is necessary for Cognitive Science. And this pragmatist turn can be characterized as the hypothesis of the essentiality of action. I will defend this hypothesis by investigating two possible objections from Pierre Steiner and Jerry Fodor. In the end,I suggest that further progress on the preliminary issue of the nature of cognitive pragmatism turns out to depend on further investigations in the theory of action and in the theory of practical knowledge.