城镇化、转移支付与地方官僚腐败

Urbanization, Transfer Payments and Local Bureaucratic Corruption

用于弥补地方政府财力不足的纵向转移支付制度和广泛实施的新型城镇化战略对我国地方腐败水平产生了明显影响。研究立足空间视角,借助空间面板杜宾模型极大似然估计法对我国2000-2013年31个省市自治区的城镇化、转移支付与地区腐败发生率之间的关系进行了深入探讨,实证发现:城镇化通过强化地方官僚晋升预期的"基建投资"冲动和降低临近地区的引资成本而助长地区腐败;中央对地方的转移支付因产生明显的属地"粘蝇纸"效应和空间外溢效应促进了地方官僚腐败;虽然直接支撑城镇化建设缺口的转移支付有利于通过"标尺竞争"秩序约束本地腐败累积,但又会因地区间"政绩竞赛"增加官员的寻租动机。因而从腐败的诱发多重根源来看,遏制与地方政府行为直接相关的财政性因素显得更为重要。

The longitudinal transfer payment system and new urbanization strategy have noticeable impact on China＇s local corruption. This paper, based on spatial perspective and SPD maximum likelihood estimation method, makes an in-depth discussion of the relationship between urbanization, transfer payments and local corruption in thirty one provinces,autonomous regions and municipalities from 2000 to 2013. What the empirical study suggests are as follows： urbanization fosters corruption by enhancing ＂infrastructure investment？＂ impulse of local bureaucrats and reducing the cost to attract investment in adjacent regions; central transfer payments to local governments facilitate the corruption of local bureaucrats as they have significant territorial ＂flypaper＂ effect and spatial spillover effect; transfer payments increase the motives for rent-seeking with power due to regional ＂achievement competition＂, though they directly meet the need of urbanization and help restrain local corruption by ＂yardstick competition＂ order. In view of various causes for corruption, it is more important to constrain the fiscal factors directly related to the behavior of local governments.