转轨背景下官员兼职规制的经济效应

Economic Effects of Dual Employment Regulation during Economic Transition

本文以中组部﹝2013﹞18号文为背景,分析了限制政府官员与高校领导干部在企业兼职、任职的文件宣告后企业的市场和财务表现。基于生存分析法的研究发现:18号文的出台显著缩短了政府官员或高校领导在企业担任独立董事的时间,使其离职概率相对提高了38.72%。采用事件研究法的结果显示:18号文发布后,处理组企业在事件窗(-5,+5)的9个交易日内股票累计超额收益率比对照组平均下降了1.14%,并且政府关联企业和高校关联企业都受到显著的负面影响。结合样本企业的季度数据构建DID模型发现:18号文发布后,处理组企业的贷款规模以及销售收入同比增长率发生显著下降,但企业的研发支出水平显著上升。本文的研究发现可能意味着18号文这一官员兼职规制文件正逐渐切断政府官员、高校领导与企业之间的利益输送机制,对于理顺政企关系、抑制政府官员和高校领导的寻租行为将发挥重要促进作用。

Using the release of Document No. 18 by the Organization Department of CCP as a natural experiment, this paper empirically studies how the ban on the hiring of government officials and college leaders in listed firms affects their stock return and financial performance. We conduct a survival analysis and find that the regulation significantly increased the daily departure rate of independent directors who are targeted by 38.72%. Based on this result, we study how the regulation affects targeted firms＇ stock returns by employing the event study approach. We find that the cumulative abnormal stock returns of firms in treatment group is 1.14% lower than that in the control group in the event window （-5, ＋5） after release of Document No. 18. The effects are significantly negative for both government-connected firms and university-connected firms. Finally, we adopt the difference-in- different method to explore how Document No. 18 affects finn financial performance based on quarterly data. We provide evidence that the release of Document No. 18 significantly reduced loan access and sale growth of affected firms but increased their expenditure on R＆D activities. These results suggest that the dual employment regulation is shutting off the channels through which government officials, university leaders and firms exchange interests, which is crucial for straightening the government-firm relationships and restraining the rent-seeking behaviors of government officials and university leaders.