地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释

Strategic Interaction of Regional Environmental Regulation——An Explanation on the Universality of Incomplete Enforcement of Environmental Regulation

当前中国的环境规制"非完全执行"现象是环境保护事务面临的核心问题,本文尝试从策略互动角度对其普遍性给出新的解释。中国式分权下环境规制被地方政府视为争夺流动性资源的博弈工具,导致地区间环境规制的策略互动行为,从而孕育了环境规制非完全执行的普遍现象。以此为突破口,本文借助于广义空间自回归模型实证检验了地方政府在环境规制方面的策略互动行为,并进一步探讨了影响地区间环境规制策略互动的因素。研究发现,地区间环境规制存在显著的互补型策略互动,意味着如果竞争地区降低环境规制强度,那么本地区也会相应降低环境规制强度,体现了环境规制非完全执行的传染性,从而较好地解释了环境规制非完全执行的普遍性。同时,2006年后地区间环境规制的互补型策略互动行为有所减弱,凸显了不断强化的环境绩效考核的作用。此外,财政分权与腐败强化了地区间环境规制的策略互动,而公众环保诉求则有效弱化了地区间环境规制的策略互动。

Considering that China＇s current environmental regulation being not completely implemented is the key problem of environmental protection affairs, this paper attempts to give a new explanation on its universality from the perspective of strategic interaction. Under the background of Chinese style decentralization, environmental regulation is regarded as a tool for local governments to compete for liquidity resources, leading to the inter- regional strategic interaction of environmental regulation which causes the universal phenomenon of incomplete enforcement. Taking this as a chance, this study employs Spatial Autocorrelation Model to identify the specific form of the inter-regional strategic interaction of environmental regulation and explore the influence factors of strategic interaction. Empirical resuhs confirm that adjacent provinces do exist strategic interaction of environmental regulation. Furthermore, the strategic interaction of environmental regulation belongs to complementarities. That is to say, a decrease in stringency of environmental regulation in one province will cause a decrease in its neighbors, which reflects the infectivity of incomplete enforcement. So, it is better to explain the universality of incomplete enforcement of the environmental regulation. Meanwhile, the inter-regional strategic interaction of environmental regulation gradually weakens after 2006, which highlights the role of environmental performance assessment. In addition, fiscal decentralization and corruption stimulate the inter-regional strategic interaction of environmental reaulation, and environmental demands of the public on the contrarv.