摘要
本文是在当代农业的生产效率快速提高、农业生产环境不断恶劣的背景下,研究农业生产工人在保护健康方面存在的"道德风险"问题。以往文献中对工人在保护健康方面的道德风险问题主要是从保险合同的角度来考虑。本文从一个新的视角来研究工人在采取防护措施以保护健康时存在的道德风险问题。根据经典的委托代理理论,尽管使用企业提供的防护设备被证明能够显著降低工作环境对健康的危害,但由于使用防护设备努力的成本由工人承担,同时由此带来的受益无法被工人独享,所以农业工人采用防护设备的努力水平低于最优水平,因此存在道德风险问题。本文通过研究美国猪肉生产企业数据,验证了在存在雇用关系的企业中确实存在"道德风险"问题。其工人佩戴防护设备的概率比不存在雇用关系的企业中的工人低10%;由于工人生病带来了边际劳动生产率下降,雇主为了应对道德风险,在实践中采用了激励合同来激励工人进行防护。我们的实证结果与理论预期一致。
In spite of theoretical predictions and abundant empirical evidence on moral hazard in medical insurance, evidence on moral hazard associated with work environment is very scarce. We study moral hazard problems associated with occupations by using employee survey data in the U. S hog industry. With improved efficiency and economy of scales in agriculture production, work environment is becoming more hazardous. We find that, even though agricultural producers provide protective devices to reduce the negative effect of worse environment on employee's health, employees may not wear them, which leads to moral hazard behaviors. The probability to use a protective device is 10% lower in the farms with agency contracts than in family farms that bear no agency contracts. The producers are shown to be able to help improving employee's health by designing an incentive contract, reducing pollutants and providing protective devices.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第7期93-108,共16页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金
中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划"中国低生育率的微观决策和宏观政策研究"
国家自然科学基金项目"人口预期寿命
退休政策如何影响职业选择--基于中国人力资本投资的视角"(项目编号:71403303)
关键词
道德风险
激励合同
工作环境
防护设备
健康
Moral hazard Incentive contract Working environment Protective devices Health