摘要
以2011~2014年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,基于薪酬辩护的视角,考察管理层权力对薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响以及产品市场竞争的监督约束作用。实证结果表明,企业高管利用手中权力获取超额薪酬、谋取私利的同时,会通过提升薪酬—业绩敏感性为自身薪酬进行辩护,形成薪酬契约合理有效的表象;产品市场竞争能够显著抑制企业高管的薪酬辩护行为,降低管理层权力对薪酬契约的影响和扭曲。
Based on the samples of listed companies in China from 2011 to 2014,this paper investigates the impact of managerial power on pay for performance sensitivity and the impact of supervision under product market competition from the perspective of compensation justification.The main empirical results indicate that when corporate top managers use their power to get excess compensation and seek their own interests,they will also increase the pay for performance sensitivity to justify the reasonability of compensation,and present a reasonable and effective compensation contract.Product market competition can inhibit top managers＇ behavior of compensation justification significantly,and then reduce the impact and distortion on compensation contract under managerial power.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期105-110,共6页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
关键词
管理层权力
超额薪酬
薪酬—业绩敏感性
薪酬辩护
产品市场竞争
Managerial power
Excess compensation
Pay for performance sensitivity
Compensation justification
Product market competition
