投资机会、集团关联担保与经济后果——基于内部资本市场视角的研究

Investment Opportunity,Group Related Guarantee and Economic Consequence:from the Perspective of Internal Capital Market

本文基于企业集团内部资本市场的视角研究投资机会对集团关联担保的影响以及集团关联担保的经济后果,结果发现:上市公司投资机会越多,其获取集团关联方担保的可能性越大,为集团关联方担保的可能性越小;从异质性角度看,对于融资约束较高的企业,投资机会与获取担保之间的正向关系更强,与对外担保之间的负向关系更弱;相对于国有企业,民营企业投资机会与获取担保的正向关系更强,与对外担保的负向关系更弱;从经济后果上看,上市公司获取担保提高了公司绩效并且减少了控股股东的资金侵占,而对外担保则降低了公司绩效并且增加了控股股东的资金侵占。本文的结果说明,投资机会是集团关联担保的重要决定因素,集团母公司基于自身利益,根据上市公司的投资机会决定内部资本市场的资源分配以及关联担保的方向。

This paper surveys the impact of investment opportunity on group related guarantee and the economic consequences of related guarantee from internal capital market perspective.We find that if the listed firm has more investment opportunities,it will be more likely to get related guarantee and less likely to provide related guarantee.From heterogeneous point,for highly financially constrained firms,investment opportunity is more positively related to getting related guarantee and less related to providing related guarantee.Compared with state-owned firms,the investment opportunity of Non-state-owned firms is more positively related to getting related guarantee and less related to providing related guarantee.From the effect point,getting related guarantee can improve firm's performance and lower the expropriation of block shareholders while providing related guarantee lowers firm's performance and increases the expropriation of block shareholders.The result shows that investment opportunity is a key factor of determining related guarantee.Group parent firms will determine the resources allocated in internal capital market and related guarantee based on listed firms' growth opportunity to accord with its own interest.