银行债权人缺失的零杠杆政策会加重非效率投资吗?

Would Zero-Leverage Policy with Absence of Bank Creditors Increase Inefficient Investment?

基于银行债权人缺失的视角,研究了零杠杆政策是否会加重上市公司的非效率投资。由于银行债权人的缺失,采用零杠杆政策会产生更加严重的信息不对称和代理问题,而信息不对称和代理问题正是影响投资效率的两个主要因素。实证研究也表明,零杠杆政策确实会通过加重信息不对称和代理问题而增加上市公司的非效率投资。考虑到不同的监督机制之间可能存在一定的替代作用,进一步研究发现,随着其他外部监督作用的增强,公司治理水平不断提高,零杠杆政策由于银行债权人缺失对非效率投资的影响会逐渐减弱。

From the perspective of absence of bank creditors, this paper examines whether the zero-levcrage policy would increase the inefficient investment of the listed companies. Due to the ab- sence of bank creditors, to adopt the zcro-levcrage policy would result in more serious information asymmetry and agency problems, which are the two major factors affecting the efficiency of invest- ment. The empirical results also show that the zcro-leverage policy will indeed increase the inefficient investment through increase information asymmetry and agency problems. Taking it into considerations that a certain substitution effect may exist between different supervisory mechanisms, a further study reveals that along with the strengthening of other external monitoring and the improving of corporate governance, the effects of zcro-leverage policy on inefficient investment will be weakened by and by because of the absence of bank creditors.