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双重信息非对称下认知协作网激励机制设计

Cognitive cooperative networks incentive mechanism design under dual information asymmetry
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摘要 针对认知无线网络中协作通信中继节点自私性的需求和非对称网络信息的特点,提出一种基于合约机制的协作通信激励方法。针对中继节点私有行为引起的道德风险问题,研究单一信息非对称条件下合约激励方法;在此基础上,针对中继节点私有信息和行为引起的逆向选择与道德风险并存问题,研究双重信息非对称条件下频谱合约激励方法,甄别其真实能力信息并激励其中继努力行为。实验结果表明,雇主授权用户雇用信道状态好、协作成本低的非授权用户,能获得较大的协作通信增益。 A cooperative communication incentive mechanism was proposed based on the characteristics of asymmetric network information and selfishness of relay users in cognitive radio networks.To avoid the moral hazard problem due to the hidden-ac-tion of secondary users (SU),a contract-based relay selection model was proposed to incentivize SU to participate in relay com-munication industriously.To avoid the moral hazard and adverse selection problems due to the hidden-action and hidden-informa-tion of SU,a contract-based dual information asymmetric model was proposed to incentivize the contribution of SUs for ensuring cooperative communication.Results show that,by hiring the SUs with better channel condition or less relay cost,primary user can obtain much more cooperative communication utility.
出处 《计算机工程与设计》 北大核心 2016年第7期1705-1708,1719,共5页 Computer Engineering and Design
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(61501178 61540027) 湖北省自然科学基金项目(2015CFB646) 广东省重大科技专项基金项目(2013A022100017) 太阳能高效利用湖北省协同创新中心开放基金项目(HBSKFMS2014033) 湖北工业大学博士科研启动基金项目(BSQD13029)
关键词 认知协作网络 双重信息非对称 合约设计 道德风险 逆向选择 cognitive cooperative networks dual information asymmetry contract design moral hazard adverse selection
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