民生目标下政府的支出竞争和福利效应

The Wellbeing-Oriented Competition of City Government Spending and the Welfare Effects

本文研究不同政绩考核目标下地方政府间财政支出决策的互动机制,使用全国地级城市面板数据和空间杜宾模型估计地方政府支出反应方程,并利用民生类公共支出竞争的空间效应拟合值估计其对居民福利的影响。空间计量分析表明,同一省区内的城市在基本公共服务支出政策方面存在相互模仿攀比,民生类公共支出竞争不仅提高了省内民生类公共服务水平,而且牵动了居民消费。研究结果为如何完善地方官员考核体系和提高民众福利提供了政策启示。

This paper studies the interactive mechanism of local government spending under different performance goals,employs a panel dataset of China＇s prefecture cities and the spatial Durbin model to estimate the optimal response equation,and uses the fitted values of spatial effect of government spending to assess the effect on resident utility. The econometric analysis shows that cities within the same provinces imitate each other in wellbeing-oriented spending and that the competition not only raises the level of public services,but also promotes the private spending on consumption. The research findings imply how the assessment system of local officials can be improved and the wellbeing of general public be raised.