谈判势力与战略性贸易政策

The Bargaining Power and Strategic Trade Policies

本国企业通过第三国中间商向第三国出口产品,并与另一国直接向第三国出口的企业进行产量竞争,本国企业根据其谈判势力大小确定其出售给中间商的产品价格。在此背景下,本文考察了一国最优的战略性贸易政策。研究结果表明,谈判势力影响到本国政府抽取中间商的利润,进而影响本国政府的出口贸易政策选择。对另一国政府而言,其贸易政策的选择则受到企业进入市场的时序与企业谈判势力的影响。此外,两国出口政策的博弈并不一定会导致"囚徒困境"。

A domestic firm indirectly exports products to a third country through a retailer from this third eouatry, and competes in quantity domain against foreign firms who directly export to this third coun- try. Meanwhile, the bargaining power of a domestic firm determines the intermediate prices it provides the retailer with. Based on the above backgrounds, this paper explores a country＇s optimal strategic trade poli- cies. The results show that the bargaining power impacts on domestic government＇s trade policies by affecting her incertive to extract the retailers＇ profit. For a foreign government, the optimal trade policy depends on firms entering market timing and bargaining power between the retailer with the domestic firm. Moreover, the trade policy game between two countries may not become a ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂.