非对称公平关切下供应链最优决策研究

Research on the Optimal Decision of Supply Chain in Asymmetry of Fairness Concern

考虑零售商的公平关切为其私有信息,基于委托代理理论研究公平关切对供应链最优决策的影响。研究表明:在非对称公平关切下,零售商的最优订货量及效用随其公平关切程度的增加而递减;制造商的期望利润随零售商公平关切程度或零售商保留效用的增加而递减;在对称公平关切下,零售商的最优订货量与其公平关切程度无关,零售商仅获得其保留效用;制造商的期望利润与零售商的公平关切程度无关。

This study investigates the influence of fairness concern information on the optimal decision of supply chain based on Principal-agent theory,considering the retailer＇s fairness concern is its private information and unknown for the manufacturer.Results show that the retailer＇s optimal order quantity and utility decrease with the increase of the retailer＇s fairness concern while the manufacturer＇s expected profit decreases with the increase of the retailer＇s fairness concern or the retailer＇s reservation utility,while the optimal order quantity is independent of the retailer＇s fairness concern and the retailer only gains the reservation utility and the manufacturer＇s expected profit is not relevant to fairness concern under symmetric information case.