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信托受托人亲自管理义务的规范模式——比较与选择 被引量:2

Regulation Patterns of Trustee's Liability for Handling the Trust Affairs in Person——Comparison and Choice
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摘要 比较法上存在两种具有代表性的亲自管理义务规范模式。美国的谨慎义务规范模式赋予受托人决定是否委托第三人处理信托事务的广泛的自由裁量权,并对受托人违反亲自管理义务适用过错责任,对受托人委托第三人处理信托事务持鼓励态度。日本的委托权规范模式仅赋予受托人委托第三人处理信托事务的有限的自由裁量权,并对受托人违反亲自管理义务适用严格责任,对受托人委托第三人处理信托事务持限制态度。谨慎义务规范模式体现了受益人最大利益原则,并且与受托人的亲自管理义务的本质相契合。我国信托法对受托人委托第三人处理信托事务仍然持严格限制的立场,显然不合时宜,在未来的改革中可以借鉴美国的谨慎义务规范模式重构受托人亲自管理义务的规则。 There are two typical regulation patterns of trustee's liability in comparative law. The America's duty of prudent administration entrusts broad discretionary powers to trustee to decide whether or not to delegate an agent to deal with trust affairs,and regulates that the trustee is applied to fault liability if he or she breaches personal duty of administration,and encourages an agent to deal with trust affairs. In contrast,the regulation pattern of power of delegation in Japan entrusts limited discretionary powers to the trustee for delegating an agent to deal with trust affairs,and regulates that the trustee is liable for strict liability if he or she breaches personal duty of administration,which shows that Japan restricts the powers of trustee to delegate an agent to deal with trust affairs. The America's duty of prudent administration is in the maximum interests of the beneficiaries and in compliance with the essence of personal administration of the trustee. However,China's trust law strictly restricts the agent in deal with trust affairs,which is inappropriate. It is advisable for China to improve the principle of personal administration of the trustee by learning from America's duty of prudent administration.
作者 姚朝兵
出处 《西南石油大学学报(社会科学版)》 2016年第4期47-53,共7页 Journal of Southwest Petroleum University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 贵州民族大学引进人才科研基金资助项目"第三方支付服务的信托法规制研究"(15XRY001)
关键词 受托人 亲自管理义务 谨慎义务 委托权 规范模式 trustee duty of personal administration prudent duty power of delegation regulation pattern
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参考文献13

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