政府关联与房地产企业过度投资行为的关系研究

Influence of Political Connection on Listed Real Estate Companies' Excessive Investment Behavior

为探究政府关联对企业过度投资概率的影响,基于1999~2013年房地产A股上市公司数据,识别房地产企业过度投资行为;在此基础上,选取国有股比例、实际控制人的国有性质作为政府关联变量,对企业政府关联与过度投资行为的关系进行分析。发现政府关联与房地产企业过度投资概率存在正向关联;更进一步,在区分了实际控制人的中央国有和地方国有性质后,地方国有背景会显著提高公司过度投资的概率,地方政府扩大财政收入和提高政绩表现的动机提高了政府关联房地产企业过度投资的概率。为进一步深化国有企业改革的必要性提供了新的实证依据。

Based on the data of the listed real estate companies in China from 1999 to 2013,the effect of policy connection on real estate companies＇ excessive investment behavior is studied. It is found that state-owned real estate companies are more likely to make excessive investments compared with those of non-state-owned real estate companies. In particular,local state-owned real estate companies are likely to make excessive investment more significantly compared with central state-owned real estate companies. This is related to the motivation of enlarging local finance and improving performance of the local government. The result provides empirical evidences for the necessity of reform for the state-owned enterprise.