契约执行效率、工资与劳动报酬份额

Contract Enforcement Efficiency,Wage and Labor Income Share

理解契约执行效率改善对工资增长和劳动报酬份额下降并存的影响机制,对于改善收入分配、提振内需有极其重要的意义。本文将不完全契约理论引入动态一般均衡模型,并发现契约执行效率通过影响要素价格而提升劳动边际产出,从而提高工资水平,契约执行效率提升还通过产业结构效应导致劳动报酬份额下降。此外,本文还使用1998—2007年中国工业企业数据库和1997—2009年中国省际面板数据,考察契约执行效率对工资和劳动报酬份额影响的经验证据,并得到与理论模型一致的实证结果。

Understanding the impact of contract enforcement on wage growth and labor income share decline is very important for improving income distribution and boosting domestic demand. This paper adds incomplete contract theory into dynamic gen- eral equilibrium model, we show that better contract enforcement improve wage by capital accumulation and bring labor income share down by changing industrial structure. Then, we test these hypothesis by Chinese industrial enterprises from 1998 - 2007 and China provincial panel data, and empirical results are in line with theoretical hypothesis.