摘要
本文基于双边市场理论,研究了互联网平台型企业发生横向合并后的均衡定价及利润的变化。研究发现,发生横向合并后,均衡定价并不必然上升,取决于合并所产生的成本节约,以及交叉网络外部性强度的相对大小。无论合并是否产生了成本节约,合并平台的利润总会上升,并且继续保留两家平台在市场中的独立运营是更有利的。而对于未参与合并的平台来说,当交叉网络外部性很强时,其利润总是会下降;当交叉网络外部性较小时,其利润上升或下降取决于合并所产生的成本节约大小。
Based on two-sided market theory, this paper studies the change of equilibrium price and profit after the horizontal merger of Internet platform companies. This paper finds that the equilibrium price will not necessarily rise after the merger. The change depends on the cost saving generated by the merger and the intensity of cross network externality. Regardless of whether the merger generates cost saving, the profit of merged platforms will always rise and keeping the two platforms in the market for independent operation will be more favorable. For platforms that are not involved in the merger, the profit will always decrease when the intensity of cross network externality is strong. When the intensity of cross network externality is weak, the change of profit will be determined by the cost saving generated by the merger.
出处
《上海管理科学》
2016年第3期30-34,共5页
Shanghai Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"平台型企业的商业模式研究"(项目号:71472121)
国家社科基金重大项目"信息网络技术对市场决定资源配置的影响与对策研究"(项目号:14ZDB137)
关键词
双边市场
互联网
平台型企业
横向合并
two-sided market
Internet
platform companies
horizontal merger