税收激进行为的外溢效应——来自共同审计师的证据

Spillover Effect of Tax Aggressiveness——Evidence from Common Auditor in China

本文以2003年至2014年沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司为样本,实证发现企业的税收激进行为具有通过共同审计师传导的外溢效应,即与税收激进的企业有共同外部审计师的客户也会体现出税收激进行为。企业的税收激进行为是企业代理问题的一种表现,审计作为企业的一种外部治理机制,对这种行为具有监督和抑制作用。企业的税收激进行为通过共同审计师的外溢效应体现出不同审计师之间监督作用的系统性差异。进一步检验发现,国际四大会计师事务所和较高的地区税收征管强度对这种外溢效应具有抑制作用。

Using data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 2014,we find that companies who have a common auditor with companies suspected of tax aggressiveness also demonstrate tax aggressiveness behavior. We name this phenomenon as ' the spillover effect of tax aggressiveness' through common auditor. Tax aggressiveness is caused by agency problem,and an auditor could serve as an external governance force to monitor and constrain this behavior. The spillover effect of tax aggressiveness through common auditor indicates a systematic difference of this monitoring force. We also find that big4 auditors and high tax enforcement can restrain the spillover effect of tax aggressiveness through common auditors.