盈余管理、高管薪酬-业绩敏感性与内部控制治理效应

Earnings management,executive pay-performance sensitivity and the Internal Control Governance Effect

以2006—2014年我国沪深两市上市公司为样本,考察不同方向盈余管理对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响,并探讨内部控制对该现象的治理效应。研究发现,盈余管理会降低薪酬-业绩敏感性,将盈余管理按照不同方向分组的回归结果显示,当管理者进行向上调增的盈余管理时,高管薪酬与公司业绩呈显著正相关关系,而当管理者进行向下调减的盈余管理时,高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的正相关关系有所减弱。对此,企业良好的内部控制具有一定的治理效应,能够削弱盈余管理对薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响,但针对不同方向的盈余管理,内部控制的治理效应有所不同。研究显示,在采用业绩性薪酬制度的背景下,管理者权利的存在会诱使高管通过盈余操纵来影响自身收益,现行的内部控制虽然具有治理效应,但仍存在缺陷,实践中需进一步完善内部控制的执行方式,提高内部控制质量,从而使其实现应有的治理效应。

Using the sample of China＇ s Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from the year 2006 to 2014, this paper investigated in the impact of different directions Earnings management have on executive pay - performance sensitivity, and to explore internal control＇s governance effects towards this phenomenon. We found that earnings management will reduce pay- performance sensitivity, and regression results turned out to be different according to the directions of earnings management. In detail, positive earnings management has a positive impact on this sensitivity while negative earnings management has a negative impact. Internal control can reduce this impact, but the extinct to which is far from ideal situation. This study shows in the case of pay - for - performance, the existence of managerial power may induce earnings management so as to affect managers＇ compensation. It proves internal control has achieved many good results, and its effect can be further enhanced.