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网络多方冲突演化博弈行为策略研究 被引量:8

Research of Evolutionary Game Behaviors of Multilateral Conflict Participants in Network Mass Incidents
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摘要 [目的/意义]网络多方冲突的产生受参与主体的非理性化情绪和利益支配影响,利用演化博弈论方法可以从根本上探究冲突的成因和演化动力。[方法/过程]以"百度血友病吧被卖"事件为例,通过构建网媒—网络公司—网民、政府—网民的博弈模型来探究该事件影响下的网络群体性事件与多方冲突演化博弈行为,利用复制动态方程分析参与主体的策略选择,再利用雅克比矩阵对平衡点进行稳定性分析。[结果/结论]根据博弈结果可知:当网媒、网络公司与网民分别采取推动、解释与参与冲突时三方的利益得到最大的满足,为演化稳定策略。此时,政府对网络冲突的有效疏导可以合理控制网络群体性事件的负面影响,进而提出具有针对性、合理性的应对策略。 [Purpose/Significance]Network of multilateral conflict is influenced by participant,s irrational emotion and interest control, the causes of conflict and the evolution of the power can be fundamentally explored through the evolutionary game theory method. [ Meth-od/Process] The "Baidu hemophilia sales, events" is given as an example, based on the idea of evolutionary game theory, the network mass incidents and various evolutionary game behaviors of conflict participants under the influence of events are further studied. Network media, network companies and users as well as the government and Internet users of the game model are established, replicated dynamics equation analysis is used to select the participation strategy of each participant, and the stability analysis is used to measure the equilibrium point by the Jacobi matrix. [ Result/Conclusion] According to the result of the game theory analysis, when the conflict is promoted by the media, network companies and Internet users, the interests of these three parties reach the maximum and the participants are practicing the evolutionary stable strategy. At this point, the negative impact of network mass incidents can be reasonably controlled through government ,s effective guidance to the online conflict, and the pertinence and rationality of coping strategies are put forward at last.
作者 杨尊琦 张琳
机构地区 天津财经大学
出处 《情报杂志》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第7期86-94,共9页 Journal of Intelligence
基金 天津财经大学项目"研究生科研资助计划"(编号:2015TCS32)研究成果之一
关键词 网络群体性事件 复制动态方程 雅克比矩阵 演化稳定策略 network mass incidents replicated dynamic equation Jacobi matrix evolutionary stability strategy
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