节假日高速公路免费政策下私家车车主的博弈决策分析

Analysis of the Game Equilibrium Between Government and Private Car Owners Under the Free use of Highways in the Holidays

为方便公众在节假日快速出行,我国于2012年开始实施节假日高速公路免费通行政策。这一措施在为公众带来优惠的同时,造成了更为严重的拥堵,由此在社会中引发了关于免费、收费的广泛讨论。文中运用完全信息动态博弈分析政府的免费通行政策与私车车主出行之间的博弈机制。首先分析了政府和私车车主在各自战略选择下的博弈均衡状态,发现政府具有两个战略选择、私家车车主则具有四个战略选择;进而运用斗鸡博弈分析私家车车主之间就是否出行展开的博弈,该博弈包括两个纯策略均衡和一个混合战略均衡;最后根据以上研究结果,提出了以适度收费政策为主的相关政策建议。

In order to expedite traffic during holidays,the government has put forward a free highway toll policy on major holidays since 2012. It reduces travel costs of the public. However,it has also brought choking congestion and caused a wide discussion on whether to charge or not. First,we have contracted a dynamic game model of complete information between the government and private car owners. With the government having two strategies and private car owners having four strategies,we work out the game equilibrium under their own strategies respectively. Then we have used the chicken game model to analyze the competition between the private car owners,and this game includes two pure strategy Nash equilibrium and one mixed strategy equilibrium. According to the above results,we put forward the related policy suggestions,like charging a moderate fee.