小型农田水利设施项目建设监督博弈与制度集成化嵌入

On Supervision Game of Constructing Small Water Conservancy Facilities and the Embeddedness of Integrated Systems

小型农田水利设施项目建设中,监督机构与施工单位之间的博弈分析结果表明,监督机构的监管成本C和渎职成本D、施工单位的处罚成本F和机会主义行为收益K对双方的策略选择均会产生重要影响。提高D和F、降低C和K均会提高(长期或短期)施工单位选择"实施质量管理"策略的概率,但对监督机构选择"监管"策略概率的影响方向和程度并不相同。要提高施工单位实施质量管理及监督机构进行持续监管的积极性,就要实施制度集成化嵌入。

The game analysis of the supervision game between the supervisory organization and the construction organization shows that the regulatory cost C and malpractice cost D of the supervisory organization,the penalty cost F and opportunism behavior benefit K of the construction organization have an important influence on the strategy choice of the supervisory organization and the construction organization,increasing the D and F,reducing C and K will increase（long-term or short-term） the probability that the construction organization chooses the strategy that ＂the quality management is implemented＂,but have an different influence on the probability that the supervisory organization chooses the ＂supervision＂ strategy in the direction and degree.The embeddedness of the integrated institutions should be implemented in order to improve the enthusiasm that the construction organization implements quality management and the enthusiasm that the supervisory organization implements continuous supervision.