高管激励、环境规制与技术创新

Executive Incentives,Environmental Regulation and Technological Innovation

以2007-2014年沪深A股上市的重污染行业的公司为研究对象,构建交互效应模型,实证检验了环境规制对技术创新的影响,以及高管激励与环境规制交互效应对技术创新的影响。研究结果发现环境规制对技术创新有显著的促进作用,但是这种促进作用在国有企业以及非东部地区企业中并不明显,表明波特假说的成立有一定的条件。其次,高管短期薪酬与环境规制的交互作用、高管持股比例与环境规制的交互作用对技术创新均存在正向作用。而高管在职消费仅在东部地区企业中增强波特假说的有效性。

Using 2007 -2014 Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed companies of heavily polluting industries as the study sample , this paper constructs an interactive model to empirically test the impact of environmental regulation on the tech -nological innovation and the impact of interactive effects between environmental regulation and the related factors of the execu -tive incentives on technological innovation.The study shows that environmental regulation positively contributes to technologi -cal innovation improvement , but the effect is not noticeable in the state-owned enterprises and enterprises in non-eastern are-as.Which indicates that the establishment of Porter Hypothesis requires certain conditions .In addition, both the interactive effects between environmental regulation and executive salary , and the interactive effects between environmental regulation and executive share proportion have positive influence on technological innovation , while perquisite consumption could enhance the effectiveness of Porter Hypothesis only in eastern area businesses.