摘要
美国公司治理在法律规范层面表现为由董事忠实义务、注意义务、善意义务和中介机构不协助或教唆义务、警告义务等一系列信托义务所构筑之“义务群”,形成公司治理的所谓“董事义务中心主义模式”。在公司治理实践中,股东利益之实现在根本上依赖于董事信托义务之履行,以董事会结构为中心的公司机关体系和中介机构与专业人士信托义务体系从内部和外部两个方面保障董事诸项义务之实现。本文的研究揭示出,义务和权利在民商法领域同等重要,中国在公司证券立法乃至未来民法典的制定中,应当注重法律关系主体各项法律义务的妥当设定,另外,公司治理法律制度的实践和运行必须在更大范围内取得人们对其意义及义务构造的共识,特别是应进行广泛而深刻的司法改革,强化司法独立和提升法官职业水准。
In American Corporate Governance, fiduciary duty is the core legal concept to conclude the directors' duty of care, duty of loyalty, duty of good faith and intermediary institutions' duty of not aiding-abetting, duty of warning etc., formating corporate governance of the central principle of duty. In the practice of corporate governance, the realization of the interests of shareholders depends on the performance of the duties of the directors, which safeguarded by the company's agency system and the intermediary institutions' fiduciary duty system from the two aspects of the internal and external. This study reveals that the obligations and rights are equally important in the field of civil and commercial law. China shall pay attention to the subject of legal relationship in the legal obligations properly detailed set in the formulation of legislation of companies and even in the future civil code. On the other hand, legal system of corporate governance practice and operation must get the common understanding of its meaning and obligation structure within the wider, especially extensive and profound judicial reform should be carried out, strengthening the independence of the judiciary and to enhance the level of professional judges.
出处
《南京大学法律评论》
CSSCI
2016年第1期265-289,共25页
Nanjing University Law Review
关键词
公司治理
委托代理
董事
看门人
信托义务
Corporate Governance
Agency
Fiduciary Duty
Directors
Intermediary Institutions