大股东治理体制对现金持有价值的影响——基于“掏空”与“支持”双重动机视角

The Influences of Large Shareholder Governance Regimes on the Value of Cash Holdings:Based on the Perspectives of Tunneling and Propping Motives

为了促进公司采用匹配于其治理环境的现金政策,从"掏空"与"支持"双重动机视角研究了大股东治理体制影响现金持有价值的机理。基于我国A股上市公司2002-2013年的数据,使用门槛回归模型,将大股东治理体制细分为"制衡"与"独裁"两种类型,检验和比较了不同治理体制下的现金持有价值。实证结果表明,相比"制衡"型体制,"独裁"型体制下现金持有价值较低,并且这种差距在非国有公司中更为明显。进一步的检验发现,"独裁"型体制增强了非国有公司中大股东的"掏空"与"支持"动机,以及国有公司中的"掏空"动机,但是并未增强国有公司中的"支持"动机。结论为,"制衡"型体制下公司应当持有较多现金,"独裁"型体制下应当持有较少现金。

To help companies employ cash policies suited for their governance environments,this paper studies the mechanism of majority shareholder governance regimes affecting the value of cash holdings from two perspectives： Tunneling and Propping motives. Based on the data between 2002 and 2013 from China＇s A-share listed companies,using threshold regress models,large shareholder governance regimes are divided into two types： Balance and Dictatorship,and the corresponding values of cash holdings are tested and compared.The empirical results show that,compared to Balance regime,the value of cash holdings under Dictatorship regime is lower,and this gap is more significant for non-state-owned companies. The results of further tests show that,Dictatorship regime reinforces large shareholders＇ Tunneling and Propping motives in non-state-owned companies,and Tunneling motives in state-owned companies,but not Propping motives in state-owned companies. The conclusion is that,companies should hold more cash under Balance regime and less cash under Dictatorship regime.