信息非对称下军工企业主导的供应链收益共享机制协调模型

The Revenue- sharing Mechanism Coordination Model of the Military Enterprises- led Supply Chain under the Information Asymmetry

信息非对称性导致供应链低效率,使其不能协调。当军工企业具有批发价格和收益、收入共享比例决策权,而仓库具有隐匿边际成本信息和订购量决策权时,军工企业可设计一个对仓库私有成本信息的不可观测性付出代价来激励仓库的收益共享机制,结果发现虽然会因获得真实的成本信息而付出了甄别费用,导致其利润低于信息对称下的收益,而仓库却可以从中获得大于信息对称情况下的额外收益,供应链收益低于信息对称下的收益。但各方收益随着仓库订购成本的增加而减少,可在原收益共享机制的基础上,适当降低批发价,加大仓库的订购量,使军事供应链重新协调。

The information asymmetry leads to the supply chain low efficiency and it can not be realized the coordination. When the military enterprises holds the decision-making power of wholesale price and revenue sharing proportion,the warehouse holds the hidden marginal cost information and order quantity decision,the military enterprises may design a motivate warehouse revenue sharing mechanism by paying for the private warehouse cost information though which can not be observed,find that though paying for the screening cost to the true cost information,which results in that the profit is lower than symmetric information income,while the warehouse can derive greater than the symmetric information additional revenue,the supply chain profits is below than the symmetric information income.But the parties revenue is increasing with the warehouse cost reducing,can appropriate reduce the wholesale price based on the original revenue sharing mechanism,increase the warehouse order amount,so that the military supply chain can be re-coordinated.