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三级分权、支出偏好与雾霾治理的机理——基于中国式财政分权的博弈分析 被引量:14

Three-Level Fiscal Decentralization, Expenditure Preferences and Haze Governance Mechanism:Based on A Game Model Analysis of Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization
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摘要 立足于"财政分权、政治集权"的治理结构,从纵向妥协和制度创新、横向策略性博弈双维度,剖析基层政府在经济发展和雾霾治理双重任务中与省级政府、中央政府以及周边同级政府间的策略互动特征。双重任务委托-代理模型表明,纵向财政不平衡诱发的妥协与制度创新会扭曲基层政府的努力函数和选择偏好,激励基层政府通过隐匿方式创造预算外收入,强化对经济生产活动的努力,导致EKC曲线上移。横向策略性博弈行为下的税收竞争模型表明,基层政府向排污企业收取租金共谋私利,为吸引生产要素,相邻省份在空气质量执行标准上存在"逐底竞争"现象。因此,雾霾治理要以推进环境财税体制改革为核心,改变属地治理模式,强化财政透明法治、官员终身问责与社会监督等制度保障体系建设。 Based on the governance structure of " fiscal decentralization and political centralization" and from the double dimensions of longitudinal compromise with system innovation and horizontal strategic game, this article tries to analyze the characteristics of strategic interaction of the grassroots governments with the provincial governments, the central government and the neighboring governments at the same level when carrying out the double tasks of economic development and haze governance. The dual-task principal-agent model shows that the compromise evoked by vertical fiscal unbalance and institutional innovation would distort the strive function and choice preference of the local governments, stimulate them to create extra-budgetary revenue through concealed means, and strengthen their efforts in economic production activities, which would lead to the upward movement of EKC Curve. The taxation competition model under the horizontal strategic game shows that the local governments would charge rents from the pollution discharging enterprises to seek personal gains. In order to attract production factors, the adjacent provinces would have "bottom-line competitive" behaviors when carrying out the air quality standards. Thus, in order to improve haze governance, the government should promote the reform of environmental fiscal and taxation system, change the localized governance mode, and strengthen the construction of such institutional guarantee systems as fiscal transparency and rule of law, officials lifelong accountability system, social supervision and so on.
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第8期24-32,共9页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金 国家社科基金重点项目"我国雾霾成因及财政综合治理问题研究"(15AZZ010) 中央财经大学研究生科研创新基金资助项目"县域公共服务供需结构失衡问题研究"(201401)
关键词 财政分权 三级分权 政府支出偏好 雾霾治理 绿色财税制度 fiscal decentralization three-level fiscal decentralization government expenditure preferences haze governance green fiscal and taxation system
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