摘要
在康德《纯粹理性批判》一书中,"先验对象"无疑是一个十分复杂的概念,甚至康德本人在运用它时也出现不少含混之处。"先验对象"在第一版"先验演绎"中被明确地提出来,但是在第二版中又奇怪地消失了。对此,很多研究者都给出了自己的解释。同时,"先验对象"与"本体""物自身"等概念经常被康德放在一起讨论,三者之间究竟是怎样的关系?这又激发起研究者们的各种意见。笔者认为,我们可以从"双重意义"的视角分析"先验对象":一种是在消极意义上,将"先验对象"理解为脱离感性直观而形成的纯粹知性对象,它只是可思维的;另一种是在积极意义上,"先验对象"是能够产生经验知识的先天的根据,它既是可思维的,也是可认识的。换句话说,在消极意义上,它和"本体"与"物自身"一样,发挥着限制知性逾越经验界限的作用;而在积极意义上,它是形成经验性知识的必要条件,是范畴具有客观有效性的依据。因此,就内容而言,它包含着后两个概念。与此同时,通过对这一概念的分析表明,两版演绎的区别其实并没有那么明显。
The "transcendental object" is undoubtedly such a complex concept in Kant's The Critique of Pure Reason that Kant himself sometimes makes use of it vaguely. The "transcendental object" was put forward clearly first in the "transcendental deduction" (first edition), but strangely disappeared in the second edition. For that, many researchers have put forward different explanations. Meanwhile, Kant often talks about the "transcendental object", "noumenon" and "things in themselves" together. What are the exact relations between the three concepts? This problem has always inspired the researchers' different interpreta- tions. On the basis of Kant's text, this paper argues that the "transcendental object" can be understood from the perspective of the "double meanings" : One is in the negative sense while the other in a positive sense. The former regards the "transcendental object" is a pure intellectual object that can be thought merely; the latter thinks of the "transcendental object" as the ground a priori which can bring forth the knowledge and not only can be thought but also known by us. In other words, in the negative sense, the "transcendental object" functions like " noumenon" and " things in themselves" to prevent intellectuality from tran- scending experience; in the positive sense, it is the prerequisite for the formation of experiential knowledge and the basis of the objectivity of categories. In terms of content, therefore, the "transcendental object" includes the two latter concepts. The analy- sis shows that the "transcendental object" illustrated in the two versions has no obvious differences.
出处
《内蒙古大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2016年第4期64-71,共8页
Journal of Inner Mongolia University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
中共北京市委党校校院级科研项目(项目批准号:2015XQN006)
国家社科基金后期资助项目(项目批准号:13FZX010)
关键词
先验对象
物自身
本体
双重意义
The transcendental object
things in themselves
noumenon
the double meanings