摘要
Based on data for 2005 to 2012, an analysis of the compensation gap between top executives at different Chinese listed companies reveals the following conclusions. (1) The large compensation gap existing among executives at listed Chinese companies--in some years even larger than that between rank-and-file employees--is mainly caused by the exorbitant executive compensation at a minority of companies. (2) Between 2005 and 2012, the compensation gap first widened dramatically and then diminished gradually. The leading factor in this fluctuation was the drastic rise and fall in the level of executive compensation at a handful of financial enterprises. The main reason for the narrowing of the compensation gap is central government regulation, which has helped to curb the excessive growth of executive compensation in society as a whole. (3) Even in the same round of fluctuation, state-owned listed companies differ markedly from non-state-owned listed companies in the way their executive compensation is decided. (4) State-owned listed companies' executive compensation strategies and their internal governance structure have not played their due role in moderating the overly rapid growth of their executives' compensation or in reducing the compensation gap.
利用2005-2012年中国上市公司数据对企业之间高管薪酬差距的分析,有以下结论:(1)中国企业之间高管薪酬差距较大,在某些年份甚至高于一般员工之间的工资差距,主要原因在于少数企业高管的超额薪酬。(2)2005-2012年企业之间高管薪酬差距呈现急剧扩大、后逐渐缩小的走势。波动的主导因素是少数金融企业高管薪酬水平的大起大落;高管薪酬差距缩小的主要因素是政府对国有企业高管的限薪政策。中央政府对国有企业高管薪酬加以约束,将有助于抑制全社会企业高管薪酬的过快增长。(3)在同一波动中,国有上市公司高管薪酬的决定机制与非国有公司仍有明显差别。(4)国有企业高管薪酬决定机制及公司治理结构,并没有在缓解高管薪酬过快增长和缩小薪酬差距方面发挥应有的作用。
基金
supported by Ministry of Education as a major project in philosophy and social sciences(11JZD015,12JZD030)
the Special Fund for Basic Research at Central Universities(2012CXQT11,310400086)