内部控制、产权性质与超额在职消费——基于2007—2014年非金融上市公司的经验研究

Internal Control,Nature of Ownership and Excess Perquisites——Empirical study based on non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2014

在充分梳理国内外在职消费研究文献的基础上,以内部控制对于上市公司超额在职消费的抑制作用为主要研究目标,从外部政策变化视角入手,即借助限薪令和八项规定的颁布,利用厦门大学内部控制指数(2007—2014),区分国有与非国有上市公司,对我国2007—2014年非金融上市公司内部控制和超额在职消费的关系进行了研究。结果发现,高质量的内部控制显著降低上市公司超额在职消费程度,运用工具变量控制内生性之后,上述结论依然稳健,而且,国有上市公司中内部控制对于超额在职消费的抑制作用更为明显;分别对2009年限薪令出台的前后情况、2012年八项规定出台的前后情况进行了研究,发现政策生效后内部控制对国有上市公司超额在职消费的抑制作用更加明显。

Based on a comprehensive overview of domestic and foreign researches of perquisites, the main objective of this paper was to study the effect of internal control on the excess perquisites of listed companies. The paper star- ted from the perspective of external policy changes such as the promulgation of Pay Ceiling Order and the Eight Rules, us state-own ing ed internal control index of Xiamen University （2007-2014） while distinguishing state-owned and non- listed companies to study the relationship between internal control and excess perquisites of non-finan- cial listed companies from 2007 to 2014. The results showed that higher quality of internal control significantly re- duced the excess perquisites of listed companies, and after using instrumental variables to control endogenous, the a- bove conclusion remained robust. Furthermore, the restraint of internal control on excess perquisites was more obvi- ous in state-owned listed companies. At last,this paper respectively compared the situation before and after the？ distribution of Pay Ceiling Order in 2009, and before and after the？ distribution of the Eight Rules in 2012 ,finding that the internal control of state-owned enterprises was better at restraining excess perquisites after the policies come into effect.