产品服务化供应链协调的收益激励机制

Revenue Incentive Mechanism in Coordination of Product Servicization Supply Chain

针对产品服务集成商与产品服务供应商的协调问题,采用委托代理理论,建立收益激励模型,并对模型进行求解和分析。最后,提出相应的收益激励策略。研究表明:①在完全信息情况下,当产品服务供应商是风险规避的,产品服务供应商的公平偏好程度与收益激励系数正相关。②在不完全信息情况下,当产品服务供应商是风险规避的,产品服务供应商的努力水平、服务能力系数、服务创新投入程度、服务质量系数与收益激励系数正相关;产品服务供应商的努力成本系数、风险规避系数、外部环境变量的方差与收益激励系数负相关。

In this paper, in view of the problems in the coordination of the product-service integrator and the product-service supplier, we used the principal-agent theory to build the revenue incentive model of the two, then solved and analyzed it, and at the end, proposed the corresponding revenue incentive strategy. Through the analysis, we found that, first, when under complete information, if the product-service supplier was risk aversive, its fairness preference was positively correlated to the revenue incentive coefficient, and second, when under incomplete information, if the product-service supplier was risk aversive, its effort level, service capacity coefficient, service innovation input and service quality coefficient were positively correlated to the revenue incentive coefficient and the reverse was true for the effort cost coefficient, risk aversion coefficient, and variance of the external environment variables.