期刊文献+

反垄断法中“宽恕制度”的最优安排——一个文献综述 被引量:4

The Optimal Design of “Leniency Program” in Antitrust Law:A Survey of Literature
下载PDF
导出
摘要 "宽恕制度"(又称"公司赦免条款")是反垄断法中用以鼓励参与垄断协议的企业主动坦白,并协助反垄断机构破获整个垄断组织的一种赦免制度。在我国最新制定出台的反垄断法中也包含"宽恕制度"。本文通过对欧美"宽恕制度"最新的理论文献和立法经验进行综述得出结论:我国应采用更接近于欧洲模式认定赦免范围,即对前来告发垄断组织的非主谋公司进行宽恕,但要根据是否在调查开始前告发、告发的顺序、提供证据的数量和质量区别对待;可以考虑采用与垄断利润、是否属再犯挂钩的比例罚款,抑制长期垄断组织或者多次缔结垄断组织的存在;在警惕"恶意诬告"的前提下,我国还可考虑发展对企业或者个人告发者进行正面奖金奖励,以此合理地激励垄断组织成员主动自首,打击甚至杜绝垄断组织。 "Leniency Program" (or "Corporate Amnesty Program") is an amnesty mechanism in Antitrust Law to encourage firms in cartel agreement to report their wrongdoing and help the antitrust organization to break the cartel. The latest China's legislation of Antitrust Law also takes into some essence of Leniency Program. This paper concludes by surveying the latest theoretical literature and legislation experience from US and European countries that: it is advisable for China to take the selection criteria similar to those in European countries, meaning to give leniency to non-originating firms in the cartel according to if it reports before or after the investigation begins, and its ranking in the "running to report". We may also consider setting fines according to the monopoly profit and if the wrongdoer commits for the first time, and introduce bonus to firm and individual informant if enough caution is taken against false report, to make it more powerful incentive scheme to break and deter cartels.
出处 《产业经济评论》 2016年第4期5-15,共11页 Review of Industrial Economics
关键词 反垄断法 宽恕制度 赦免 法和经济学 JEL Classification K21, L41, L44
  • 相关文献

参考文献23

  • 1Apesteguia, J., Dufwenberg, M., and Selten, R. 2007. Blowing the whistle. Economic Theory, 31(1), 143-166.
  • 2Aubert, C, Rey, P, and W. Kovacic 2006, "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels" , International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24 (2006) 1241-1266.
  • 3Becket, G., 1968. "Crime and punishment: an economic approach" . Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217.
  • 4Bigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S. O., Le Coq, C., and Spagnolo, G. 2012. Fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust. The RAND Journal of Economics, 43(2), 368-390.
  • 5Bigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S. O., Le Coq, C., and Spagnolo, G. (2015). Trust, leniency, and deterrence. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 31(4), 663-689.
  • 6Brenner, S. 2009. An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(6), 639-645.
  • 7Brisset, K., and L. Thomas, 2004, "Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions", European Journal of Law and Economics, 17: 5-19, 2004.
  • 8Feess, E. and M. Walzl, 2003 "Corporate leniency programs in the EU and the USA", German Working Papers in Law and Economics: Vol. 2003: Article 24.
  • 9Friedman, J.W., 1971, "A non-cooperative equilibrium for super games" , Review of Economic Studies, 38, pp. 1- 12.
  • 10Hammond, S., 2000, "Detecting and deterring cartel activity through an effective leniency program" Paper by the Director of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.

同被引文献58

引证文献4

二级引证文献21

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部