国有企业董事会权力配置模式研究——基于二元权力耦合演进的视角

Research on Power Distribution Model of the SOE Board——Based on the Perspective of Dual Power Coupling Evolution

面对国有企业董事会当前改革进程中存在的制度合法性与行为有效性之间的矛盾,本文分析了国有企业董事会内部经济型权力和行政型权力的二元分化与耦合机制,并立足中国国有企业公司治理转型的宏观背景,进一步构建了董事会内部权力配置及其演化路径。本文指出,国有企业董事会通过协调和优化董事来源,可以有效配置董事会内部权力结构,从"行政决定型"逐步转向"行政嵌入型"和"行政监督型",进而构建了符合中国公司治理情境的国有企业董事会内部权力配置模式。基于中国2012—2014年国有上市公司的实证数据,本文发现:国有企业董事会存在"一把手决策、行政化严重、独立性较弱"等问题,政府行政干预会对企业经营发展产生一定程度的负面影响,而过多地依赖董事会经济型权力又容易导致"内部人控制"等问题,经济型董事比例与企业绩效存在显著的正"U"型关系,国有控股比例对董事会权力配置模式作用的发挥起到一定的调节作用。作为对策,本文对不同类型国有企业董事会权力配置模式进行针对性分析,对"去行政化"做进一步的解读,同时提出了国有企业董事会未来权力配置要面对的新问题,探索性地提出了精准治理的改革方向。

Faced with the contradiction between institutional legitimacy and behavior effectiveness of the board of state-owned enterprise （SOE） in the current reform process, this paper analyzed the dualization of internal economic power and administrative power of the SOE board and its coupling mechanism. Based on the macro- background of the Chinese SOE governance transition, we further constructed the internal power distribution and evolution path of the board of directors. This paper pointed out that the SOE board can distribute the internal power structure effectively through coordinating and optimizing the source of directors, forming the process of the type from ＂administrative decision＂ to ＂administrative intervention＂ and ＂administrative supervision＂, and then constructed internal power distribution model of SOE board which conform to the Chinese corporate governance situation. Based on the data of Chinese state-owned listed companies from 2012 to 2014, we have found that there are problems of ＂top decision-making, serious administrative management and weak independence＂ in the SOE board, the government＇s strong interference will have significant negative effect on the enterprise development to some extent, and emphasized more economic power on the board will lead to the problem of ＂internal control＂. There is a significant positive ＂U＂ relationship between the proportion of economic directors and corporate performance, the proportion of state-owned shares has regulative function on the power distribution model of the board. As a countermeasure, this research analyzed different types of power distribution model of the SOE board, and further interpreted the ＂de-administration＂. At the same time, this paper put forward the new problem of future power distribution of SOE board and direction of reform for precise management.