摘要
由于企业系统可靠性这一内部因素对企业绩效以及激励机制建立均会产生影响,考虑这一因素,运用非完全信息动态博弈方法,在以往的长短期激励模型基础上增加了企业系统可靠性指标,对经营者长期和短期激励组合进行了探讨,同时讨论了模型的最优解以及相关参数对最优解的影响,从而得到相应结论.
Taking into account the influence of reliability factor about enterprise system to the incentive mechanism, the author discusses a kind of principal-agent model about long-term and short-term optimum combination for the reward incentive to managers with reliability index and several linear restraint equations under the asymmetrical information condition. Through the analysis about optimum of the model, the author analysis the influence of parameters to the optimum solution and get the conclusion accordingly.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2016年第14期248-254,共7页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金青年科学基金(11301090)
广东省自然科学基金自由申请项目(2015A030313896)
广东第二师范学院教授
博士专项项目(2013ARF(GDEI)02
2013ARF(GDEI)08)
关键词
激励机制
可靠性
动态博弈
委托-代理
线性约束
incentive mechanism
reliability
dynamical game
principal-agent
linear restraint condition
