风动还是帆动:银监局局长更替与城商行策略性信息披露

Go with the Wind？Bureau Chief（CBRC） Turnover and Strategic Disclosure of City Commercial Banks

准确获取银行经营信息对监管者维护金融稳定和增进市场效率具有重要意义，但银行可能会利用会计自由裁量权进行策略性信息披露。银监局局长变更导致的“责任空档期”为识别银行策略性信息披露行为创造了条件。本文利用2004--2013年110余家城市商业银行（以下简称城商行）与省级银监局局长更替的匹配数据，实证发现银监局局长变更时，城商行不良贷款率显著高于其他时期，而关注类贷款比例则呈反方向变动。进一步回归并没有发现银监局局长变更伴随着银行风险资产配置的增加或银行破产风险状况的恶化。银行利用银监局局长变更导致的责任空档期，将之前通过会计自由裁量权隐藏的不良贷款集中释放出来，策略性信息披露行为得到验证。多个稳健性分析表明本文的结论具有较好的稳健性。

Accurate information on operation of banks is important for regulators to maintain financial stability and investors to improve market efficiency. But banks may strategically disclosure information due to the existence of accounting discretion. Turnover of chief of CBRC causes a ＂re- sponsibility free period＂, which can be used to identify the strategic disclosures behavior. Using the accounting information of more than 110 city commercial banks and the provincial banking bureau chief turnover information between the year 2004--2013, we find that the non-performing loan ratio of city commercial banks is significantly higher during the turnover periods than that in other periods, while special mention loan ratio change in the opposite direction. Further regressions also find no increase of bank risk assets, raise of loan growth or deterioration of bank bankruptcy risk status （Z-Score） during the turnover periods. Using the bureau chief turnover as a responsibility free peri od, banks release the hidden non-performing loans. Strategic Disclosure behavior of banks is veri fled. Our finding passes several robustness tests.