基于微分对策的产品回收对供应链协同优化的影响

The impacts of product-recovery on supply chain coordination with differential game

考虑制造商负责回收和处理废旧产品的两级闭环供应链,建立制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈下的微分对策模型,以废旧产品回收量影响的企业声誉为状态变量,利用反馈求解法得出制造商和零售商的最优决策.在此基础上,假设奖惩临界值受企业声誉影响,得出奖惩契约协调下的供应链最优决策.通过对奖惩契约有和无两种情形的决策进行对比,得出废旧产品回收成本系数与企业声誉和奖惩力度均成反向变动关系;在一定的参数条件下,采用奖惩契约能提高废旧产品的回收量,降低产品的销售价格,增加制造商和零售商的收益,达到社会、企业和消费者的多赢;当供应链系统参数满足一定条件时,相比无契约分散决策下供应链企业收益,奖惩契约的设计与实施能够持续有效地提高企业收益.

Suppose that the manufacturer is responsible for product-recovery of the two stages of closed- loop supply chain, the differential game model under the Stackelberg game leading by manufacturer is established to obtain the optimal decision for the manufacturers and retailers using the feedback method, and taking the corporate reputation as the state variable affected by the product-recovery quantity. The optimal decision of the supply chain is obtained based on the assumptions that the corporate reputation is affected by the critical vMue of reward and punishment. Comparison of the decision with reward and punishment contract to that without contract shows that the product-recovery cost coefficients and the corporate reputation are negatively related to the intensity of reward and punishment. With certain parameters, contract adoption can improve the product-recovery quantity, reduce the price of product, and increase the profits of the manufacturer and retailer, to achieve the win-win among the society, enterprises and consumers. If tile supply chain system parameters satisfy certain conditions, the enterprises profits can effectively increase with the implementation of contract compared to that without contract of decentralized decision.