制造商引入在线渠道的双渠道价格与服务竞争策略

Dual Channel Price and Service Competition after Manufacturer Introduced Direct Online Channel

为了削弱传统零售商在渠道博弈中的强势地位,制造商尝试引入直接在线渠道与传统零售商竞争。针对零售商价格领导权的渠道结构,本文在分析双渠道竞争时考虑了服务在战略决策中的价值,并将消费者区分为高服务偏好的消费者和低服务偏好的消费者。研究表明,仅当产品在线适合度足够高时,在零售商占主导权的渠道中,制造商引入在线渠道的战略效果才能实现,能导致制造商利润的增加,产品在线的适合度越高,利润提高越显著。当产品在线适合度足够高时,制造商引入在线渠道能够激励零售商提高服务质量,而且产品在线的适合度越高,服务质量提高越明显;在线渠道的引入能达到制造商和零售商双赢的效果;制造商利润和零售商利润都会随着高服务偏好消费者比例和服务的边际效用的提高而增加。

In order to weaken the dominant status of traditional retailer in channel bargain,the manufacturer tries to introduce direct online channel to compete with the traditional retailer.Aiming at the channel structure of Retailer Stackelberg,the competitive game theory is applied to analyze the price and service competition between manufacturer and retailer in the dual channels mixed of manufacturer direct online channel and traditional retailing channel.It considers the strategic value of service when it analyses dual channel competition,and divides all consumers into the high service preference consumers and the low service preference consumers.The results show that the strategic effect of online channel introduced by the manufacturer will succeed only when the product web-fit is high enough.The introduction of online channel will increase the manufacturer profit.The larger the product web-fit is,the manufacturer profit will be bigger.When the product web-fit is high enough,online channel can encourage the retailer to provide high level service.The larger the product web-fit is,the retail service level will be higher.As a result,the effect of double winners between the manufacturer and retailer will come true.The manufacturer profit and retailer profit will increase with the improvement of the scale of high service preference consumer and the marginal utility of service.