政府内部上下级间的责任配置互动--以S市安全生产管理为例

The Interaction on Responsibility Allocation between Superior and Subordinate Government: The Case of Work Safety Management

关于政府内部互动机制,已有研究的普遍理论预设是上下级之间有讨价还价的空间,但这与我国安全生产管理领域的现实并不相符。本文以上下级的讨价还价何以消失为切入点,首先指出安全生产管理具有高度不可控和高社会成本两个组织特征,然后以S市安全生产管理责任配置过程中体现的"独裁者博弈"互动为案例,区分了不同治理情境对应的上下级互动特征,指出事故后应急式的治理情境使责任从"模糊化运作"转向"清晰化运作",上下级之间的讨价还价随之消失。政府之所以要在安全事故后问责官员,深层逻辑在于我国现阶段的合法性基础由有待完善的法理型合法性和强大的绩效合法性共同构成,且后者发挥了更基础性的作用。

A general theoretical presupposition of existing researches on interactive mechanism in government hierarchies is that there is bargaining space between the superior and the subordinate,but an obvious distinction is found in the field of work safety management. Based on the theoretical entry point of 'why the bargaining between superior and subordinate vanishes ',this paper firstly expounds the organizational peculiarities of highly uncontrollable and high social costs of work safety management. It then discusses the phenomenon of 'Dictator Game ' in responsibility allocation in S city, and distinguishes the interactive mechanisms between the superior and the subordinate under different governing situation. When the governing situation is 'to deal with emergencies post-accident ',the responsibility would turn to 'clearness operation ' from 'fuzzy operation ' and thus the bargaining vanishes accordingly. Moreover,we point out that the internal cause of clearness operation is the state legitimacy constituted by to-be-perfected legal-rational legitimacy and powerful performance legitimacy,and particularly the latter plays a more fundamental role.