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健康资源跨期错配问题研究进展 被引量:1

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摘要 健康保险、医疗储蓄与医疗借贷,是跨期配置健康资源以应对健康风险损失的主要方式。资源跨期配置与风险损失的非对称关系,使这三类资源配置在保险金额、存款规模或负债额度上,都存在与实际需求不匹配的错配问题,导致健康保障较为严重的效率损失或因病致贫问题。为了促进健康资源与风险损失的合理匹配,期望效用理论规范了财富保障效应下的最优跨期配置行为,前景理论则针对偏离最优理论规范的行为异象,从损失厌恶、参考点和概率决策赋权等角度,对错配原因和修正机制进行了全面探索。针对资源错配致贫的核心问题和配置动机多元化,更多文献趋向于研究改善医疗服务支付能力等非财富保障效应,认为只需对行为异象有选择地进行修正。但财富保障性质的保险所具有的吉芬商品属性问题,虽然对资源配置规范具有导向作用,却没有引起足够的重视。
作者 吴传俭
出处 《经济学动态》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第7期109-125,共17页 Economic Perspectives
基金 国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“健康保险投保动机、行为异象与合约激励机制研究”(15FJY017) 江苏省保险学会基金项目“健康保险的过度消费行为管控研究”(SBX20164A02) 江苏省高校品牌专业建设工程一期项目金融学(苏教高[2015]11号)
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参考文献116

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